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Sovereign Pleasures
Jayne Lewis




English at the  
University of Califor
­nia, Los Angeles. Her
 most recent book is
 Mary Queen of
 Scots: Romance and
 Nation (Routledge,
 1998). Her son, Peter,
 recently learned to say
 “please.”
I’ve always taken pleasure in anything lucid, solitary,
 
spare: the arm cleaving clear water, the one hawk in
 blue heaven. Now that I have this baby, though,
 
what  
offers itself up for joy is mysterious and curved. It 
is almost utterly shared. I wonder therefore if the fac
­ulty of pleasure is the absolute I always thought it
 was, or if its shape and meaning mutate with the
 objects available to it. This is not the same thing, by
 the way, as wondering if pleasure is Historically Con
­structed, which everything and nothing is, 
so
 why  
ask.
It’s more that we almost need to be pleased.
 
Hobbes thought so, observing in Leviathan that
 "pleasure seemeth to be a corroboration of vitall
 motion, and a help thereunto.” I like this notion of
 corroboration, as if pleasure somehow approves of our
 creaturely animation, permits it. As if we would do
 well to befriend pleasure, so that it will give us its
 help. It’s evidently in our interest to provide the plea
­sure principle with as many different subjects as pos
­sible. That way we stand a chance of getting all the
 help we need.
We need a lot. I knew someone who was in love
 
with someone. The two of them studied the same
 language, and the same problems, and once one of
 them — the one I knew — checked out a library
 book on that language and its problems. When she
 opened the book, out slipped a postcard from Venice
 or someplace twisted and ravishing and malevolent
 like that. This postcard was addressed to a woman
 she knew very slightly in the unfortunate handwrit
­ing of the man she was in love with. On the front
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were two hands clasped, a detail from some infinitely bigger canvas, and on the
 
other side was one word, which was please. You should be able to interpret
 
that  
word in a lot of different ways, but really you can
'
t. Really, the implications are  
crystal clear, and not pleasing unless the word please is addressed to you. Plea
­sure in general has this element of supplication. There is a power differential
 in it: something is given and received. Anyone pleased 
is
 lordly.
So there was John Milton, radical republican, putting pleasure at the cen
­ter of Paradise Lost, and in the most surprising ways. God, for example, when
 answering the rhetorical question of why he made Adam et al. free admits he
 did that for his own pleasure. In turn, human sovereignty is expressed through
 enjoyment. In the unspoiled paradise the one adjective you come across over
 and over again 
is
 “sweet.” Here is Milton the radical republican saying  
nonetheless that pleasure is a divine right, an absolute of human being.
Just as he was saying this, they were, if paradoxically, seeing pleasure very
 
differently in the court of Charles II. This court was notoriously sybaritic to
 say the least, a garden of priapic splendor if you believe the myth, all emanat
­ing from the lazy, cunning king at its center. Yet people there seem to have
 regarded pleasure the way Milton should have, given his mistrust of kings and
 lust and anything pretty. For one thing, they did not especially believe in it.
 The most imperfect of courtly enjoyers, the earl of Rochester, for example held
 that it’s easy
 
to “tak[e] false pleasure for true love / But pain can ne’er deceive.”  
Whereas for Milton the capacity to be pleased confirms autonomy with all its
 powers and obligations, Rochester proposed that really pleasure subjugates,
 producing illusions that only pain dismantles. If you are interested in the truth,
 you want at least to be the pleaser, not the pleased, and it’s better yet to be out
 of it altogether.
This isn’t the middle of the seventeenth century of course; it’s barely the
 
beginning of the twenty-first, and absolute sovereignty is more or less a thing
 of the past, as are perhaps the forms of enjoyment that bothered Rochester.
 Also, fewer and fewer postcards are falling out of books. Fewer and fewer
 books are being opened in the first place. Instead, most words are flickering
 through cyberspace, moth-like but more cynical than moths, less questing.
 There’s nothing for anything
 
to latch on to, which could get to be a problem for  
pleasure, seeing as how always before it seemed to work like a lock and key,
 needing something notched and unique to fit into a shape that was already
 there somehow, commanding its own contents.
I’ve noticed more and more keys disappearing from my life. For instance,
 
I have an alarm system built into my car. If I am outside the car
 
but want to be  
inside it, I am compelled to press a button on my
 
keychain. I do that and there  
is a little yelp and then the car unlocks itself but there is no pleasurable grind
­ing slide of a key’s teeth, no twist of the wrist or jolt the lock springing up,
 released. There’s no pleasure. The car’s yielding feels arbitrary, 
as
 if I just hap ­
pened to be walking by when it decided to make itself available. Recently, how
­ever, the baby was playing with my keychain and he must have jiggled some
­thing loose because the last time I pressed the button on my keyless key
 absolutely nothing happened. The car sat still for a change, and it was good, if
 somewhat inconvenient.
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Like most babies, mine has his own set of keys, colored plastic ones that he
 
likes all right, but the jingle of the real ones, or maybe their weight, pleases him
 more. In this case, his pleasure has given mine back to me, and I am humbled
 by his largesse, accidental though it is. In their way, his pleasures happen like
 accidents too. I do watch him laying down certain laws of liking. Yet at first it
 seems that objects fall to him by chance and then he will or wont piece them
 into some jigsaw of affection and, ultimately, desire. It’s impossible to say
 which comes first, the pleasure or the thing that gives it. It’s impossible to say
 if the baby is freed or bound when he learns to command this and not that —
 the banana and not the applesauce, the dragonfly and not the duck, The Snowy
 Day and never, never Good Night Moon, though (because?) he has five copies of
 it. I cannot tell if with age he is growing imperious or cowed, and if cowed
 whether it is by the brute force of his own pleasure or by the objects that pro
­voke and thereby seem to govern it.
Yet pleasure is supposed to be a primal motive; from Freud’s point of view,
 
it is an absolute motive, or at least it was until, as for Adam et al., the death
 drive made its despotic ambitions known. Jeremy Bentham was really much
 less compromising in his Principles of Morals and
 
Legislation, where even the  
most malign instincts boil down to pleasure: “Let a man’s motive be ill-will; call
 it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive; the
 pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his
 adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself is good. It
 may be faint; it may be short; it must at any rate be impure; yet while it lasts,
 and before any bad consequences arrive, it is as good as any other that is not
 more intense.”
There’s much to interest us in this particular principle of morals and legis
­
lation, but one thing is the question of what makes pleasure, even wretched
 pleasure, “good.” What seems to do that is its discreteness, its detachment
 from “consequence.” It is as if any consequence, good or bad, would make the
 pleasure itself less good. The other thing that makes pleasure good is its inten
­sity. In either case, pleasure is pure lyric. Narrative seduces and adulterates it.
 No more sweet paradise with the walls around it. Everyone: learn to say please.
So back to pleasure and the question of what it might or might not have to
 
do with history. With personal history, the troublesome skein of
 
redundancy  
and change, incursion and obduracy. With narrative history, the chain of con
­sequences from which we don’t know how to deliver ourselves and yet per
­versely reckon an affirmation of our freedom. With history history, the fath
­omless sea of particularities where the people who enjoy themselves the most
 just drown, as witness the House of Stuart, or Marie Antoinette, or poor
 Princess Di
 
just when by all accounts she was happy at last. In general, histo ­
ry seems inimical to pleasure, which requires stately domes and the instant the
 red currant bursts on the tongue. And suspense, 
as
 in the infinite pause at the  
top of the ferris wheel. Even when there is a whole piece of music, joy gathers
 to a point, a summit, perilous and absolute. You can plot it on a map, some
­how, but not in sentences.
Before the baby was born I went swimming almost every day, at once sin
­
gular and accompanied. I’m an earth sign who has trouble with liquids, but this
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was my first true and absolute maternal pleasure, the water one great hand lift
­
ing and molding me, patiently erasing the difference between the me and the
 not-me. The sun browned my back, beating a white H in the place where my
 suit straps went, and the baby would rest in the effortfill peace of my swim
­ming. Two weeks after
 
he was born  I went back to the water, assuming it would  
bless me,
 
but instead I found myself floundering there, lonely  and cold. I drift ­
ed like an empty sack, unsaved and clumsy, my grace gone.
So I turned
 
back to my books, and  to authors no one pays me to study: Tol ­
stoy
 
and  Margery Allingham. Janet  Frame. There’s a world of pleasure  in  these  
books, the pleasure of vicarious life. I hadn’t thought I would need the vicari
­ous now, with my own life suddenly so present and full, so this is a source of
 pleasure worth looking into. What for that matter is vicarious pleasure? Is it
 imaginatively experiencing the pleasures that others — even unreal others —
 take in reality, or is it taking pleasure in what happens to others, regardless of
 whether they themselves are pleased? Is it that someone else 
is
 your substitute,  
your vicar, in the stately pleasure dome?
Vicarious pleasure seems at first to have something to do with standing
 
back, apart, at that chaste, absolute point that 
is
 the solstice of history. Except  
vicis means alternation, or change, so that if you are going to be true to the
 word vicarious (and why wouldn’t you?) you have to think about there being in
 the purity of pleasure like that some sudden undulation, 
as
 of clean grass as a  
shape passes through it.
There’s an ethical thread in this that is hard but important to pluck apart
 
from the problem of definition. It has to do with what pleasure permits us to
 be to each other, its place in relations of power. Here is
 
where you  have to  bring  
pain
 
back into the picture, as a point of contrast. Vicarious pain, that is, is oth ­
erwise known as sympathy. It confirms your talent for substituting yourself for
 another, at
 
least imaginatively, and from there becomes the ground of kindness,  
of intervention in the unjust
 
business of the world. Vicarious pleasure is some ­
how more sinister; its seeker seems starved, but righteously so, haughty and
 immaculate and selfish. The thing is that pleasure of this sort, vicarious sensa
­tion of this sort, would never prod you to do anything. The opposite: it
 
would  
suspend you like Mary Poppins’s giggly uncle forever pouring tea up in the
 eaves.
And yet. It ought to be possible merely to respect the pleasures of others
 
without concerning yourself in them in any way. This would be a
 
good, in exact  
contrast to the way in which it’s a good to concern yourself in the pain of oth
­ers (short of being the one to inflict it, of
 
course). I understand that the idea  
of such a good occurred to Rebecca West: “If we do not live for pleasure we
 shall soon find ourselves living for pain. If we do not regard as sacred our own
 joys and the joys of others, we open the door and let into life the ugliest
 attribute of the human race, which is cruelty.” That’s stark, and pleasingly
 Hobbesian, albeit portentous of a world more
 
liberal than  the one Hobbes envi ­
sioned.
The woman I knew, the one who found the postcard, held it in her hand
 
and thought what shall I do. The thing is, until that moment her love affair
 had given her nothing but pleasure. She had been pleasingly drowsy all the
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while, whereas for the rest of her life (which had been going on for a long time
 
by then) she had had to keep her brain wakeful, flooded with light. With this
 man she thought she could lie still and even sink. And all the while she had
 been taking false pleasure for true love, perhaps even mistaking for pleasure
 something radically different from it. All the
 
while, the man who had been her  
bed, her dim room, her quiet house, was thinking please, and writing that very
 word, and mailing it secretly to someone else while travelling in Italy. It was
 someone else and not she who could please him, yet the survival of her own
 pleasure now demanded the denial of his. It now required the other woman to
 say no or nothing at all. As it did seem she had done, choosing to see his plea
 as nothing more than a tool, a means of marking a page she liked.
Even when pleasure 
is
 not essential, it is essential to what is essential.  
What is essential is some sense of self-rule. But the inessential 
is
 what pro ­
duces that sense. Georges Bataille worked this out in considerable detail,
 somewhat predictably identifying sovereignty ancient and modern with the
 powers of consumption, indulgence, and excess. “The sovereign, if he 
is
 not  
imaginary, truly enjoys the products of this world — beyond his needs. His
 sovereignty resides in this. Let us say that the sovereign (or the sovereign life)
 begins when, with the necessities ensured, the possibility of life opens up with
­out limit. Conversely, we may call sovereign the enjoyment of possibilities that
 utility doesn’t
 
justify. [. . . ] Life beyond utility is the domain of  sovereignty.”  
Enjoyment here subsists beyond need, which is where sovereignty is too. We
 are back to the power of pleasure, or at least to the way that enjoyment affirms
 prerogative, one’s place above and beyond. Bataille qualifies this, however, by
 speaking of “the sovereign, if he 
is
 not imaginary.” What sovereign today is not  
imaginary? Who can forget the pop psych trope of the inner child, who was
 basically the inner tyrant, and most decidedly imaginary? To the imaginary
 sovereign, enjoyment 
is
 rooted not in excess but in virtual necessity, in that  
Hobbesian assistance to our own vitality.
When the woman I knew showed her lover the postcard she’d found, he
 
didn’t deny having sent it. He did not do anything like that. Still she left it to
 him to say whether he thought she should go on loving him or not. “It’s not
 that you don’t please me,” he said. When he said it she realized that it wasn’t
 that. It was more that she had never known him to have done anything remote
­ly 
as
 playful as what he had done when he’d sent that postcard. In her mind,  
this turned out to be more decisive than the question of who had the power to
 please whom — though of course play and pleasure and power all converge in
 the end.
They do this because they did it in the beginning. In 1970 D.W. Winni-
 
cott, an expert in child’s play, was wondering why people (or at least English
 people) like having kings, and queens. He thought it had to do with the per
­manence of monarchy, with the way kings — like the indestructible object of a
 child’s play — have the power to survive the buffets of love and fury and all the
 other primitive passions. By surviving like that, sovereign figures organize “the
 paradox that links exterior reality with inner experience.” And this organiza
­tion is a great pleasure, for what is being organized is the relationship between
 the accidental and the determinate. Eventually words attempt to do the orga
­nizing for us, but it’s never quite the same.
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Speaking of words, the linguist Elinor Ochs was interested in baby talk, the
 
high-pitched ska I’ve mastered pretty well
 
by now She found that mothers the  
world over do not talk to their babies in this tone of voice. As a matter of fact,
 in some places such 
as
 Samoa you hear it only when adults are speaking to their  
superiors. The elevated singsong placates, appeases. It gives a pleasure that
 protects the speaker from lordly wrath. In the interest of democracy, I did for
 a day or two try to speak to the baby in a level alto and in sentences that didn’t
 rhyme. But it
 
was really much too hard: the family with a baby is the last bas ­
tion of absolute monarchy.
In fact, babies are the final refuge of the absolute, period. So much that has
 
been lost from the rest of the world, for better or for worse, 
is
 hiding out there  
behind the Stevie Wonder smile. Actually, my particular baby has an amazing
 smile, focused and radiant and recognizing. Nothing pleases me more than this
 smile.
In sum? Clearly there is no arithmetic of pleasure which might yield an
 
actual sum. There may be a geometry, but not one expressible in a series of
 proofs. All I wanted to ask
 
was what you can learn about pleasure by having a  
baby around. What can you learn by observing both the baby and your rela
­tionship to him? What I’ve learned is that pleasure survives its own alienation,
 and possibly even thrives on it. Also I have learned that enjoyment is primal,
 but not 
as
 much as you might think. It’s a power born of subjection, ours to  
what 
is
 already there. The subjection comes first, and then the sovereign plea ­
sure. Babies are tyrants. They demand to be pleased, but only because they
 
can  
do nothing else. It’s a relief to know this. It’s liberating in its 
way. Here are some sovereign pleasures, as specific as they are not: my mouth
 on the baby’s warm belly, blowing. Eucalyptus leaves spilling some of the sun
 on his face. Our deep chair in darkness. There are really no words for any of
 these pleasures, but that possibly is how, and why, they can bind us into a com
­mon good.
I saw a woman recently. She was bobbing up and down at the shallow end
 
of a swimming pool and in front of her, on the deck, was a stroller, its hood
 down at an angle that, frankly, recalled the bassinet in Rosemary’s Baby. Any
­way, from her place waist deep in water this woman was looking up and pour
­ing baby talk into the space under the hood. Then a man who must have been
 her partner came and wheeled the baby back. I watched the woman watch
 them go, grateful and aggrieved. After that she turned and struck out through
 the water, her arms bright, her legs lost in 
l
ight as she swam.
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